Phase A (the previous commit) added the on-chain foundations. Phase B
is the off-chain layer: post bodies live in a BadgerDB-backed feed
mailbox, and a full HTTP surface makes the feed usable from clients.
New components
relay/feed_mailbox.go (+ tests)
- FeedPost: body + content-type + attachment + hashtags + thread refs
- Store / Get / Delete with TTL-bounded eviction (30 days default)
- View counter (IncrementView / ViewCount) — off-chain because one
tx per view would be nonsense
- Hashtag inverted index: auto-extracts #tokens from content on
Store, lowercased + deduped + capped at 8/post
- Author chrono index: PostsByAuthor returns newest-first IDs
- RecentPostIDs: scan-by-age helper used by trending/foryou
node/api_feed.go
POST /feed/publish — author-signed body upload, returns
post_id + content_hash + size +
hashtags + estimated fee for the
follow-up on-chain CREATE_POST tx
GET /feed/post/{id} — fetch body (respects on-chain soft
delete, returns 410 when deleted)
GET /feed/post/{id}/stats — {views, likes, liked_by_me?}
POST /feed/post/{id}/view — bump the counter
GET /feed/author/{pub} — chain-authoritative post list
enriched with body + stats
GET /feed/timeline — merged feed from people the user
follows (reads chain.Following,
fetches each author's recent posts)
GET /feed/trending — top-scored posts in last 24h
(score = likes × 3 + views)
GET /feed/foryou — simple recommendations: recent posts
minus authors the user already
follows, already-liked posts, and
own posts; ranked by engagement
GET /feed/hashtag/{tag} — posts tagged with the given #tag
cmd/node/main.go wiring
- --feed-db flag (DCHAIN_FEED_DB) + --feed-ttl-days (DCHAIN_FEED_TTL_DAYS)
- Opens FeedMailbox + registers FeedRoutes alongside RelayRoutes
- Threads chain.Post / LikeCount / HasLiked / PostsByAuthor / Following
into FeedConfig so HTTP handlers can merge on-chain metadata with
off-chain body+stats.
Auth & safety
- POST /feed/publish: Ed25519 signature over "publish:<post_id>:
<content_sha256_hex>:<ts>"; ±5-minute skew window for anti-replay.
- content_hash binds body to the on-chain tx — you can't publish
body-A off-chain and commit hash-of-body-B on-chain.
- Writes wrapped in withSubmitTxGuards (rate-limit + size cap), reads
in withReadLimit — same guards as /relay.
Trending / recommendations
- V1 heuristic (likes × 3 + views) + time window. Documented as
v2.2.0 "Feed algorithm" candidate for a proper ranking layer
(half-life decay, follow-of-follow boost, hashtag collaborative).
Tests
- Store round-trip, size enforcement, hashtag indexing (case-insensitive
+ dedup), view counter increments, author chrono order, delete
cleans all indices, RecentPostIDs time-window filter.
- Full go test ./... is green (blockchain + consensus + identity +
relay + vm all pass).
Next (Phase C): client Feed tab — composer, timeline, post detail,
profile follow, For You + Trending screens.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Previously the endpoint accepted an unauthenticated DELETE with just
?pub=X — anyone who knew (or enumerated) a pub could wipe that pub's
entire inbox, a trivial griefing vector. Now the handler requires a
JSON body with {ed25519_pub, sig, ts} where sig signs
"inbox-delete:<envID>:<pub>:<ts>" under the Ed25519 privkey. The
server then looks up the identity on-chain and verifies that the
registered X25519 public key matches the ?pub= query — closing the
gap between "I can sign" and "my identity owns this mailbox."
Timestamp window: ±300s to prevent replay of captured DELETEs.
Wires RelayConfig.ResolveX25519 via chain.Identity() in cmd/node/main.go.
When ResolveX25519 is nil the endpoint returns 503 (feature unavailable)
rather than silently allowing anonymous deletes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The WS topic-auth check had a soft-fail fallback: if the authenticated
identity had no registered X25519 public key (authX == ""), the
topic-ownership check was skipped and the client could subscribe to
any inbox:* or typing:* topic. Exploit: register an Ed25519 identity
without an X25519 key, subscribe to the victim's inbox topic, receive
their envelope notifications.
Now both topics hard-require a registered X25519. Clients must call
REGISTER_KEY (publishing X25519) before subscribing. The scope is
narrow — only identities that haven't completed REGISTER_KEY yet could
have exploited this — but a hard fail is still correct.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Relay routes were not wrapped in any guards — /relay/broadcast accepted
unlimited writes from any IP, and /relay/inbox could be scraped at line
rate. Combined with the per-recipient FIFO eviction (MailboxPerRecipientCap=500),
an unauthenticated attacker could wipe a victim's real messages by
spamming 500 garbage envelopes. This commit wraps writes in
withSubmitTxGuards (10/s per IP + 256 KiB body cap) and reads in
withReadLimit (20/s per IP) — the same limits already used for
/api/tx and /api/address.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
RELAY_PROOF previously had no per-envelope dedup — every relay that
saw the gossipsub re-broadcast could extract the sender's FeeSig from
the envelope and submit its own RELAY_PROOF claim with its own
RelayPubKey. The tx-ID uniqueness check didn't help because tx.ID =
sha256(relayPubKey||envelopeID)[:16], which is unique per (relay,
envelope) pair. A malicious mesh of N relays could drain N× the fee
from the sender's balance for a single message.
Fix: record prefixRelayProof:<envelopeID> on first successful apply
and reject subsequent claims for the same envelope.
CONTACT_REQUEST previously overwrote any prior record (including a
blocked one) back to pending, letting spammers unblock themselves by
paying another MinContactFee. Now the handler reads the existing
record first and rejects the tx with "recipient has blocked sender"
when prev.Status == ContactBlocked. Block becomes sticky.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The mailbox previously trusted the client-supplied envelope ID and SentAt,
which enabled two attacks:
- replay via re-broadcast: a malicious relay could resubmit the same
ciphertext under multiple IDs, causing the recipient to receive the
same plaintext repeatedly;
- timestamp spoofing: senders could back-date or future-date messages
to bypass the 7-day TTL or fake chronology.
Store() now recomputes env.ID as hex(sha256(nonce||ct)[:16]) and
overwrites env.SentAt with time.Now().Unix(). Both values are mutated
on the envelope pointer so downstream gossipsub publishes agree on the
normalised form.
Also documents /relay/send as non-E2E — the endpoint seals with the
relay's own key, which breaks end-to-end authenticity. Clients wanting
real E2E should POST /relay/broadcast with a pre-sealed envelope.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Excluded from release bundle:
- CONTEXT.md, CHANGELOG.md (agent/project working notes)
- client-app/ (React Native messenger — tracked separately)
- contracts/hello_go/ (unused standalone example)
Kept contracts/counter/ and contracts/name_registry/ as vm-test fixtures
(referenced by vm/vm_test.go; NOT production contracts).
Docs refactor:
- docs/README.md — new top-level index with cross-references
- docs/quickstart.md — rewrite around single-node as primary path
- docs/node/README.md — full rewrite, all CLI flags, schema table
- docs/api/README.md — add /api/well-known-version, /api/update-check
- docs/contracts/README.md — split native (Go) vs WASM (user-deployable)
- docs/update-system.md — new, full 5-layer update system design
- README.md — link into docs/, drop CHANGELOG/client-app references
Build-time version system (inherited from earlier commits this branch):
- node --version / client --version with ldflags-injected metadata
- /api/well-known-version with {build, protocol_version, features[]}
- Peer-version gossip on dchain/version/v1
- /api/update-check against Gitea release API
- deploy/single/update.sh with semver guard + 15-min systemd jitter
